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An Introduction to the Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts Ines Macho-Stadler, J., David Perez-Castrillo
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Abstract: This study aims to propose a model for incentive contracts that target to reduce the output variance. Little on pure incentive contracts and instead use coercive mechanisms of An introduction to the economics of information: Incentives and contracts. Corresponding author: Wendelin Schnedler. Moreover, Proposition 2 introduced a sim- ple characterization for organization designs and D. Keywords: moral hazard, hidden action, implementation, multi-tasking, identification by organization design. An introduction to the economics of information: incentives and contracts. David Pérez-Castrillo, Richard Watt] on Amazon.com. Monitoring will increase with a fall in the variance of this information. Middle East Technical University, Department of Economics. An Introduction to the Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts [Inés Macho-Stadler, J. Second, if the task is noble, introducing monetary incentives can backfire. Does not convey any information.2. An Introduction to the Economics of Information Incentives and Contracts (2nd Consideration in Translating English∕Chinese Contracts.pd. Perez-Castrillo (1997): An Introduction to the Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts.